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 The Role of Preferences in Disagreements over Scientific Hypothesis:  






The Porter hypothesis suggests that environmental regulations, such as restricting firms to reduce 
pollution, stimulates innovations and create a win-win situation for the environment and for 
firms. It has received a great deal of attention from academics as well as bureaucrats who 
disagree about the applicability of the Porter hypothesis. This study tests if part of such 
disagreement can be explained by a preference-expectation relationship and if people are more 
likely to believe in a scientific hypothesis that appeals to their preferences. The results show that 
individuals’ who care more about the environment are more likely to believe in the Porter 
hypothesis.  We also discuss the capacity of economic methodology to mitigate a preference-
expectation bias and how it relates to the current practice in environmental economics. 
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 “After studying economics for six years I have reached the 
                           conclusion that there is no difference between discovery         
and creation” [Graffiti by an unknown student] (Smith, 
1982) 
 
1. Introduction  
A statement must at least meet three criteria in order to be considered knowledge: it must 
be justified, true, and believed, according to a common proposition in epistemology.
1
The scientific hypothesis used to facilitate this empirical inquiry is the well-known and 
highly debated Porter hypothesis. It  was formulated by the economist 
 Ideally, 
people form beliefs according to what is appealing to rationality and evidence. Nonideally and 
perhaps more realistically, attitudes might bias belief formation. This could be especially true 
when individuals form beliefs about something that is at the edge of their knowledge. In this 
study we test if people are more likely to believe in a scientific hypothesis that appeals to their 
preferences. 
Michael Porter  and 
developed further by Porter and van der Linde (1995) and is to date one of the most cited papers 
in environmental economics (Auffhammer, 2008). The conventional wisdom by economists at 
that time was that environmental regulations, such as forcing firms to reduce pollution, restricts 
their options and must therefore also reduce their profits. Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
illustrated with (non-random)  empirical observations that “well-designed”  environmental 
regulations  can induce efficiency and encourage innovations that help firms  to improve 
commercial competitiveness. Environmental policy was argued to be a “win-win” situation, and 
the traditional paradigm that firms  are  profit-maximizing entities  able  to take economically 
                                                           
1 Epistemology can be defined as theory of knowledge in general as opposed to philosophy of science, i.e., the 
theory of scientific knowledge.  
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beneficial measures, find the most efficient way to produce, and take decisions that benefit the 
company in the long run was questioned. 
The Porter hypothesis has received strong criticism from many economists, arguing that 
firms do not have to be triggered by an extra cost to utilize economic opportunities. In parts of 
the policymaking community, however, the perception is  different.  For example, the Porter 
hypothesis was endorsed by U.S. Vice President Al Gore (1992). Palmer et al., (1995) notes, 
“Not surprisingly, this view has also been warmly received by environmentalists and by 
regulators eager to avoid being seen as imposing unwanted costs on businesses or lower levels of 
government.”  On the other side of the dispute,  Porter and van der Linde (1995) declared 
economists,  as a group,  to be unrealistic in their “static mindset that environmentalism is 
inevitably costly.” Bromley (2004) notes that not believing in the Porter hypothesis puts some 
economists in a quite agreeable position to acquire profitable research contracts and consulting 
opportunities to calculate the cost and benefits of various projects. As an alternative explanation, 
Bromley (2004) also suggests that economists might believe that certain common positions, for 
example on the Porter hypothesis, are necessary to belong to the profession.
2
As a complementary explanation to  the disagreement over  the Porter hypothesis,  the 
motivation of this paper comes from social psychology, where it has been repeatedly shown that 
people can have biased belief formation according to what might seem desirable instead of what 
is  appealing to 
  
rationality  and  evidence.  Alloy and Abramson (1979,  1988)  showed that 
depressed people may not view the world gloomier but that well-adjusted people might view the 
world in rosier colors than objectively warranted. This is known as depressive realism in the 
psychological literature. Subsequently,  a  significant amount  of evidence has been presented 
                                                           
2 This is in line with Boulding (1969) who pointed out that the scientific community is a subculture in society and, 
just like any other sub cultures characterized by a strong common value system. 
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supporting that the mere desire for a particular outcome can inflate its judged probability, which 
shows that optimism is a consequence of wishful thinking.
3  Granberg (1983) defined wishful 
thinking as “a preference-expectation link”
4
The aim of this study is to test if beliefs about the Porter hypothesis can be explained by a 
preference-expectation link. We test if individuals that have stronger environment preferences 
(measured by the environmental apathy variable) also believe more in the Porter hypothesis. 
Assuming that knowledge about the applicability of the Porter hypothesis is uncorrelated with 
environmental preferences the preference-expectation relationship (bias) is tested.
  based on  the  expectation  that  people predict 
favorable outcomes according to their wishes. Three types of events have been used to study 
wishful thinking in the literature: 1) Personal life events, for example the probability not to be ill 
the whole winter. 2) Social events, such as the outcome of competitive sports events. 3) Aleatory 
events that are neutral  unless externally endowed with value.  As far as we know, scientific 
hypothesis has not been used before as an event of wishful thinking.   
5
A few studies have empirically found that there is a strong correlation between 
economists’ policy positions and their ideological values (e.g., Fuchs et al., 1998; Mayer, 2001). 
Friedman (1953) discussed the role of subjective judgment in economics and argued that the 
background of a scientist is not irrelevant to the judgment she reaches. One reason for this, he 
argued, could be that evidence in economics is seldom conclusive. Another reason mentioned 
  
                                                           
3 For readers interested in this literature in psychology see e.g., Weinstein, 1980, 1982; Babad, 1987; Babad and 
Katz, 1991; Babad and Yacobos, 1993; Fischer and Budescu, 1995. Bar-Hillel and Budescu (1995), found little 
evidence of wishful thinking bias and concluded that wishful thinking is hard to isolate from background and prior 
knowledge. Bar-Hillel et al. (2008) suggest that wishful thinking might work indirectly with the causal link: “I wish 
for, therefore I focus on, therefore I believe in.” This suggests that wishful thinking may be related to confirmation 
bias, i.e., the tendency to interpret evidence to fit existing beliefs.   
4 In psychology, preferences are evaluative judgments in the sense of liking or disliking a stimulus. For the 
remainder of this article we will apply this definition.  
5 There are no reasons to believe that the subjects of this study have knowledge about the applicability of the Porter 
hypothesis. Especially considering that it is a complex issue still under investigation which most people, irrespective 
of their environmental preferences, are not aware of.   
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was the possibility of researchers becoming persuaded by conformity in accepting a hypothesis. 
Based on the results of this paper a second aim is to discuss if and how economic methodology 
offers control against a preference-expectation bias. Hence, if a preference-expectation bias is 
found it is important to understand features in scientific methodology that could prevent biased 
judgments in science and of scientists. Finally, we end with a discussion about how our findings 
relate  to  the practice in environmental economics by linking our results to  Folmer and 
Johansson-Stenman (2011) that offers a sober review of this literature.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research hypothesis.  
The survey design is presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the results.  Section 5 discusses 
how economic methodology offers control against a preference-expectation relationship. Section 
6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis  
Our main hypothesis states that individuals who care more about the environment are 
more likely to believe in the Porter hypothesis.  The more an  individual cares about the 
environment, the more she would like to see strict policies to preserve it. Such policies might, 
however, be rejected  if they are unreasonably costly for the firms.  The  Porter  hypothesis 
overcomes such obstacles as it de-emphasizes the trade-off between the environment and the 
firms. Hence, to believe in the Porter Hypothesis is certainly appealing for someone with strong 
environmental preferences and could distort their beliefs proportionally to the strength of their 
preferences.  Alternatively, the preference-expectation  relationship  can also be explained by 
cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959). Dissonance occurs when someone 
perceives a logical inconsistency in their beliefs that causes an uncomfortable psychological 
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tension. The trade-off  between economy and environment  could potentially cause such 
psychological tension.  Individuals that care less about the environment and more about the firms 
(and possibly the owners of the firms) can, according to the theory, reduce feelings of dissonance 
by exaggerating the cost
6
Thompson and Barton (1994) found that individuals who are ecocentric (i.e. individuals 
that value  nature for its own sake)  are  more likely to engage in conservation while 
anthropocentric individuals (i.e. individuals that value nature because of material or physical 
benefits it can provide for humans) are less likely to conserve. Based on these relationships, two 
ancillary hypotheses are also put forward: the first holds that ecocentric individuals are more 
likely to believe in the Porter hypothesis and the second holds that anthropocentric individuals 
are less likely to believe in the Porter hypothesis. 
  of environmental policy and only recall evidence that disconfirms the 
Porter hypothesis. Hence, while wishful thinking can make people exaggerate their beliefs that 
the Porter hypothesis is true, cognitive dissonance can make them understate their beliefs.  
 
3. Survey Design 
  
3.1 Participants and procedure 
In 2010, an  online  survey  was conducted in Jena, Germany. The subjects were 
undergraduate students, who were recruited using the Online Recruitment System for Economic 
Experiments (ORSEE). They were told that the survey was expected to take around 15 minutes 
to complete. The recruitment letter as well as the survey makes clear that the answers from the 
                                                           
6 Shu and Bazerman (2010) argues that climate change skeptical has changed their beliefs from “there is no 
problem” to “we aren´t responsible” to “it´s too expensive to fix” and they relate this behavior to cognitive biases.  
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survey would be used for research purposes only. The survey is non-consequential
7 and there 
were no incentives for the respondents not to tell the truth. The subjects were incentivized by a 
lottery procedure with a 10 percent probability to win 10  euros.  In total 290  subjects were 
recruited, about one half of them students of economics and business administration and the 
other  half students of science  (i.e.,  biology,  medicine, chemistry, and  physics).  As  in all 
experiments, one should of course be careful and not blindly generalize results from a student 
sample to the wider population. One could, however, argue that the evidence in this study is 
suggestive of how students form beliefs about scientific hypotheses under limited knowledge and 
discuss reasons why certain groups of individuals, such as policymakers or scientists, would be 
an exemption to such observed behavior.
8
 
   
3.2 Survey and measures  
The survey is divided in two parts. In the first part, the subjects are informed about the 
Porter hypothesis.  This  is  followed  by a question  to  elicit their beliefs about the Porter 







                                                           
7 Non-consequential means that the responses to the survey question were not intended to be used as input to policy 
and thereby bear any direct consequences to the survey participants.  
8 Basically there are two possibilities of why scientist might be immune to preference-expectation bias. They could 
either have a personal trait that makes them immune to distorted judgments or it could be something in the scientific 
methodology that offers control against the preference-expectations bias. We will explore the latter possibility in this 
study.  
9 Some people have raised the objection that the Porter hypothesis only applies to “well-designed” regulations. Of 
course by defining “well-designed” regulations as something that makes the Porter hypothesis to be true, one could 
only conclude that the Porter hypothesis is true and any empirical investigation of the likelihood of it being true 
would be redundant.  
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Immediately after reading the information script the subjects are asked about how likely 
they think the Porter hypothesis is true in a scale between 0 and 100. Of course one cannot 
exclude that the wording of the information script is leading and thus influential in eliciting the 
responses and that the script presents a very simplified view of the Porter hypothesis. On the 
other hand, the interest of this study is not on students subjective beliefs about the Porter 
hypothesis per se but to  test if beliefs about the Porter hypothesis can be explained by a 
preference-expectation link.  
In the second part, the respondents are asked questions about their environmental attitude 
using the psychometric scale developed in Thompson and Barton (1994). Twelve items are used 
to measure ecocentrism. The items measure appreciation of nature for its own sake, positive 
affect and stress reduction associated with being out in nature, and the connectedness between 
humans and animals. Nine items are used to measure anthropocentrism. This reflects concerns 
with environmental issues because of the demands of human utility but not those of animal 
welfare. Finally, apathy toward the environment is measured using nine items. These reflect lack 
Recently, there has been a debate considering the economic effects of governmental interventions. One view 
is that governmental interventions in the form of environmental regulation make firms worse off. This position 
assumes that firms are successful at profit maximizing and that interventions therefore make the firms worse 
off. This position argues that environmental protection comes at a cost.   
 
Another view, known as the Porter Hypothesis, is that stringent environmental regulations can induce 
innovations that in the long term will make the firms as well as the environment better off. This view puts 
forward a win-win situation (i.e., everyone is better off). It assumes that firms systematically overlook 
profitable opportunities for innovation and that the government can therefore use restrictions to help them 
focus on financial opportunities that also are good for the environment.  This position argues that 
environmental protection, properly pursued, is often for free. 
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of interest in environmental issues and a belief that environmental threats have been exaggerated. 
The items of all scales are answered on a five-point rating scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ 
to ‘strongly agree.’ All items are listed in the appendix.  
 
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (subjective beliefs) and the explanatory 
variables (Ecocentrism, Apathy, and Anthropocentrism) are summarized in table 1. First of all, 
we want to test if the explanatory variables are independent and unaffected by the information 
about the Porter  hypothesis. Therefore, table 1 distinguishes two samples: the main sample 
informs about the Porter hypothesis and elicits subjective beliefs before asking questions about 
environmental attitudes, while the second sample reverses the order by asking questions about 
environmental attitudes before eliciting subjective beliefs. The hypothesis of equal mean values 
across the two samples cannot be rejected for any conventional significance level for any of the 
explanatory  variables using the t-test.
10
 
  This means that  the explanatory variables  are 
independent to the information about the Porter hypothesis. Turning to the dependent variable, 
using a one-tailed t-test the mean subjective beliefs is shown to be significantly higher in the 
second sample. It is possible that the series of questions about environmental attitudes in the 
beginning  of the survey triggers  wishful thinking bias and inflates  the subjective beliefs. 
Therefore, we focus on the main sample to begin with and pool the two samples in a later stage.     
 
 
                                                           
10 The reversed order sample contains students in economics and business administration. If we compare this sample 
with economics and business administration students in the main sample, we still conclude that subjects have the 
same environmental attitudes and subjective beliefs across the two samples.   
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The scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) takes the value of 0.76 for apathy and 
0.74 for ecocentrism, suggesting that the items have relatively high internal consistency. The 
scale reliability coefficient for anthropocentrism is lower and takes the value of 0,61. Since the 
internal consistency for anthropocentrism is poor and does not exceed the recommended rule-of-
thumb value of 0.7 (Nunally, 1978), we limit ourselves to testing the first of the two ancillary 
hypotheses.  
We now turn to the main part of the analysis. Figure 2 shows a two-way scatter plot, 
where the y-axis represents the degree of beliefs about the Porter hypothesis and the x-axis 
represents environmental apathy. Figure 3 shows a similar relationship but with ecocentrism in 
the x-axis.  Finally, for scrutiny we also present figure 4 showing the relationship between 
subjective beliefs and anthropocentrism. These figures are self-explaining and in line with the 
econometric results. Turning to these results, the main results from the OLS regressions
11
                                                           
11 Since the amount of observations on the censoring points is very limited with only two subjects that stated a 
subjective belief of zero and two that stated one hundred, we use a simple OLS instead of a Tobit model.   
 are 
presented in table 2. Regression 1 shows that environmental apathy makes people believe less in 
the Porter hypothesis. Regression 2 shows that ecocentrism makes people believe more in the 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Number  of Obs. 
Main Sample; Part 1 followed by Part 2 
Subjective Beliefs  61  25  0  100  246 
Apathy  18  5  9  40  246 
Ecocentrism   46  6  30  59  246 
Anthropocentrism  27  4  11  37  246 
Reversed Order Sample; Part 2 followed by Part 1 
Subjective Beliefs  66  22  5  100  44 
Apathy  18  4  10  27  44 
Ecocentrism   45  6  30  58  44 
Anthropocentrism  27  4  16  37  44 
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Porter hypothesis. Because of correlation (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.51), these two 
variables do not enter the same regression simultaneously. The remaining two regressions in 
table 2 include education and gender as control variables.  Students of economics were expected 
to believe less in the Porter hypothesis compared to students of science. However, regressions 3 
and 4 show that this is not the case. Finally, a gender effect is apparent from regressions 3 and 4. 
Males believe significantly more in the Porter hypothesis compared to females, who are more 
uncertain. For example, the predicted subjective belief from regression 3 for females is 0.57 
while for males it is 0.65. Table 3 presents four regressions using the pooled dataset.  Possible 
differences between the two samples are captured by intercept dummies in regressions 5 and 6, 
while regressions 7 and 8 also include slope-dummy interactions. Based on table 3, we can 
conclude that the results from the two samples are not significantly different since all dummy 
variables are insignificant. As we explore the practical significance of our study, predictions 
show that individuals that are most apathetic toward environmental issues expect  the probability 
of the Porter hypothesis being true to be around 25 percent while individuals that are least 
apathetic would expect around 75 percent. In summary, the results suggest that individuals with 
stronger environmental preferences believe significantly more in the Porter hypothesis. 
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Fig. 2.  Subjective beliefs VS Apathy       
 
Fig. 3.  Subjective beliefs VS Ecocentrism 
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Table 3.  Robustness check: test of order effect 
  Regression I  Regression II  Regression III  Regression IV 
  Subjective beliefs that the Porter hypothesis is true 
  Coeff.  Std.Err.  P-val  Coeff.  Std.Err.  P-val  Coeff.  Std.Err.  P-val  Coeff.  Std.Err.  P-val 
Intercept  85.128  6.124  0.000  29.368  13.227  0.027  83.402  6.305  0.000  17.532  14.078  0.214 
Apathy  -1.367  0.332  0.000        -1.522  0.335  0.000       
Ecocentrism        0.680  0.285  0.018        0.852  0.295  0.004 
Science              1.828  3.055  0.550  0.864  3.149  0.784 
Male              7.652  3.108  0.015  7.512  3.245  0.004 
Adjusted R-squared  0.06  0.02  0.08  0.04 
Nr. Obs.  246 
  Regression V  Regression VI  Regression VII  Regression VIII 
Dep Var.  Subjective beliefs that the Porter hypothesis is true 
  Coeff.  Std.Err.  P-val  Coeff.  Std.Err.  P-val  Coeff.  Std.Err.  P-val  Coeff.  Std.Err.  P-val 
Intercept  84.133  5.793  0.000  19.931  12.428  0.087  75.214  9.775  0.000  24.504  20.705  0.238 
Apathy  -1.560  0.302  0.000        -1.065  0.531  0.046       
Ecocentrism        0.780  0.261  0.002        0.698  0.447  0.120 
Science  1.829  2.977  0.540  0.928  3.081  0.764  14.760  12.325  0.232  -11.075  26.420  0.675 
Male  7.522  2.777  0.007  7.441  2.901  0.011  7.721  2.810  0.006  7.611  2.926  0.010 
Reversed order  6.182  4.177  0.137  6.888  4.264  0.110  19.531  17.654  0.270  13.522  35.018  0.700 
Apathy*Reversed order              -0.753  0.976  0.441       
Apathy*Science              -0.725  0.670  0.281       
Ecocentrism*Reversed 
order 
                  -0.146  0.765  0.848 
Ecocentrism*Science                    0.260  0.571  0.649 
Adjusted R-squared  0.09  0.04  0.09  0.03 
Nr. Obs.  290 
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5. Subjective Judgments and the Methodology of Economics  
Could disagreement in beliefs about competing theories with normative implication
12 and 
policy recommendation by academic economists also be explained by a preference-expectation 
relationship, or does this explanation only hold for the sample of students?
13
 
 The aim of this 
section is to discuss how economic methodology offers control against a preference-expectation 
bias in general and how our results link to the practice in environmental economics in particular.  
5.1 Theory, deductive methods, and wishful thinking bias 
Polanyi (1973) explains the role of theory in an illuminating way by saying that freshman 
students in medicine would not be able to give any diagnose from viewing x-rays unless they 
thoroughly understood theory in medicine. Expressed differently, there is no information value in 
observations  on its own.  In economics, deductive models provide rigorous definitions of 
assumptions and guide empirical work by pointing out plausible explanations to observations 
made and interesting hypotheses to test. On its own, however, the deductive method can neither 
reject nor confirm the Porter hypothesis unless it also convincingly affirms that the conclusions 
are  not  driven by  crucial and  unrealistic  assumptions.
14
                                                           
12 Many issues in economics have a normative nature, for example, environmental, health, and unemployment 
related issues. Such issues are believed to be more sensitive to a preference-expectation bias compared to non-
normative investigations.  
  Putting  it  differently, a deductive 
argument is truth preserving only if the assumptions/premises of the argument are true. Working 
at the edge of the contemporary knowledge, however, a realistic set of assumptions might be 
13 Winston Churchill is supposed to have complained that whenever he asked Britain's three leading economists for 
advice about economic policy, he received four different opinions. Fuchs et al. (1998) questioned if the popular 
image is justified and confirmed a very high level of disagreement among economists in various policy 
recommendations. 
14 That a model contains at least some unrealistic features is of course unavoidable as it purposes to give a simplified 
representation of the real world. Nagel (1963) distinguished three ways a statement can be unrealistic: 1) It does not 
give an exhaustive description.  2) It is believed to be either false or highly improbable on the available evidence. 3) 
It consists of idealizations and therefore does not refer to anything actual.   
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hard to identify.  This is where wishful thinking bias might cause problems  in deductive 
reasoning. To the extent the analyst has preference for a conclusion in deductive reasoning, it 
could  cause problems where the set of assumptions that generates preference  appealing 
conclusion could gain acceptance, and the conclusion will be mathematically proved. This would 
only require the ability of backward induction. More specifically, after the observation of certain 
phenomena, for example that “well-designed” environmental regulations can induce efficiency, a 
theory with overgeneralized assumptions and wide implications can be put forward to explain 
these observations. The analyst might  believe in the model that generates an  appealing 
conclusion, similar to the subjects that were told about assumptions behind the Porter hypothesis 
and had their subjective beliefs distorted by their preferences. 
A key question is what - if anything - can correct distorted beliefs? Blaug (2002) suggests 
that empirical predictions are the ultimate test of the truth in economic theories independently of 
our wishes and intellectual preferences.
 However, as we discuss next, this is not a unanimous 
position among economists.   
 
5.2 Empirics, experiments, and wishful thinking bias 
Francis Bacon, known as the father of empiricism, discussed scientific method and some 
fallacies in scientific reasoning already in 1620 in his book Novum Organum. One of the 
fallacies he discussed is the tendency of scientists to rationalize and see regularities in nature 
when no regularities exist. Experiments and observations were suggested  by him  to have a 
central role in overcoming the fallacies of scientific reasoning.   
The opinions among economists toward testing theories based on observations are more 
complex. Kagel (1987, p. 162) quotes a colleague to illustrate a common perception: “…I am a 
‘true believer’ in microeconomic theory, and as a result I am perfectly willing to accept 
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mathematical proofs without experimental evidence.”  Rubinstein (2001) argues that it is 
“hopeless and, more importantly, pointless to test the predictions of models in economic theory” 
(p. 618). Instead, he suggests that the scientist’s intuition should guide whether a theory is good 
or bad: “If a phenomenon is robust, we intuitively recognize it as such. It strikes a chord upon us. 
If we are honest with ourselves we can feel that it is true” (p. 216).
15
Sugden (2009) views the idea that substantive conclusions about economic reality can be 
deduced from indisputable facts of experience to be a mirage. Taking the instrumental view 
advocated by Friedman (1953), he claims that assumptions are acceptable to the extent that they 
lead to predictions that are confirmed. Shogren and Novell (1992) offer an intriguing comparison 
between the scientific methodologies  in economics  and ecology. They conclude that while 
economics has devoted the majority of research effort to abstract theory, with experimentation 
coming in a distant second, the methodology in ecology consists mainly of observation-based 
experiments. Morgan (1988) compared five disciplines (economics, political science, sociology, 
chemistry, and physics) based on the published work in highly regarded field journals
 Such a position follows the 
methodological tradition of Robbins (1935) that the central principles of economic theory could 
be deduced from a few self-evident axioms and definitions. A key question, then, is to what 
extent do such self-evident axioms and definitions exist?  
16
                                                           
15 To the extent researchers insist on empirical validity, Rubinstein (2001) argues that it is the assumptions that 
should be tested and not the implications of a theory. Mäki (2009) argues that no “direct” testing of assumptions 
from a model are available since: “when one seeks to test an assumption, one has to construe an argument in which 
that assumption serves as one of the major premises and which entails a predictive implication that one then 
compares with evidence.” (p. 96). The set of assumptions will therefore be confounded, and the test of assumptions 
is nothing more than another domain of testing by implications. The argument relates to the well-known Duhem-
Quine thesis that the empirical claims of hypothesis arise from the conjunction of hypothesis and background 
knowledge and that no single hypothesis can be taken in isolation but that only unfocused refutation is plausible. 
 and 
found economics and chemistry to be extremes; in economics approximately half of the papers 
16 Economic data was gathered from the American Economic Review and Economic Journal. Political science data 
are from the American Political Science Review. Sociology data are from the American Sociological Review. Data 
for the field journal in chemistry was collected from Journal of the American Chemical Society; for physics the data 
was gathered from Physical Review.   
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were theory-without-data while in chemistry none of them were. The other disciplines string out 
along the way between these extremes: in order from economics come political science, 
sociology, and then physics. Smith (1989) suggests that economics is more theory-intensive and 
less observation-intensive than perhaps any  other science.  This  development  might be a 
reflection of the difficulties to test theories in economics. This is not necessarily a problem; 
Darwin’s successful theory of evolution also lacks falsifiable predictions.
17
How about the practice of environmental economics? In a recent and critical review of 
conventional environmental economics, Folmer and Johansson-Stenman (2011) notes that there 
is a tendency for theory and empirics to live rather separate lives in environmental economics. 
They conclude that standard theory offers too narrow a perspective for many real world problems 
and that many theories are not empirically tested. They welcome a development which includes 
‘logical duels’ between competing theories, more interaction between theory and empirics, and 
more integration between the social sciences. They argue that this is needed to link theories to 
facts and in the development of adequate policy issues.  In fact, the strong normative orientation 
in environmental economics makes it potentially even more vulnerable to distorted beliefs and a 
preference-expectation bias compared to other subfields.   
    It  does  imply, 
though, that economic methodology has less control against wishful thinking bias than many 
other sciences.    
Is evidence a cure against distorted beliefs? In the past years, there has, after all, emerged 
an  ample amount of empirical studies that tests the Porter hypothesis (for an overview, see 
Brännlund and Lundgren, 2009).  Bayesian theory tells us that subjective  beliefs  about 
hypotheses are bound to change in the face of new relevant data. There are, however, many 
                                                           
17 Theories are valuable for many different reasons. They could, e.g., be descriptive or discover inconsistencies in 
previous theories.   
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obstacles. Whenever we face evidence confirming our beliefs, we might be more apt to accept it, 
while disconfirming evidence might be met with skepticism and a demand for more evidence, 
better analysis,  and  more control.  In fact, control is a key issue in both experimental and 
empirical studies.  Econometric and non-experimental studies will be challenged to justify the 
sampling procedure, omitted variables, functional form and miss-specification of the error term.  
Articles about data mining (i.e., Lovell 1983; Leamer 1983; Ziemer 1984) criticize that empirical 
researchers often test several model specifications and, without discussing the long and vigilant 
search process, subjectively select a final model to be included in the paper.  Even if researchers 
do not suffer from distorted beliefs and favor a model that confirms preconceived opinions, this 
creates a problem if it leaves room for skepticism. Duhem-Quine problem also gives scientists 
reasons to be careful with hoping that experiments can control wishful thinking since it will be a 
matter of judgment whether an observation that rejects certain hypothesis of a theory offers high 
degree of control or if the observation is a byproduct of some auxiliary assumptions that is made 
to construct empirical hypothesis associated with the theory.
18
In conclusion, looking into the economic practice in general we will not find a unanimous 
position on how to prevent distorted beliefs. An appealing suggestion is, however, that empirical 
predictions are the ultimate test of the truth in theories independently of our wishes and 
intellectual preferences. Based on this criterion, both the economic and environmental economic 
practice seems to offer less control to wishful thinking bias in comparison to other disciplines.  
  
On the other hand, science is not an act in isolation but rather a dynamic, interactive 
process with individuals eager to educate, criticize, and discipline each other. Including these 
                                                           
18 Whether or not the instructions are clear and the incentives sufficient are for example two recurrent auxiliary 
assumptions in economic experiments.  
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cultural aspects as part of scientific methodology could be crucial to understand progress in 
science and foster convergence of scientific consensus. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Anyone that ever has listened to policy discussions between economists can witness that 
disagreement about economic facts seems almost as common as disagreements about economic 
goals. A careful observer would also notice that sometimes it even seems like that beliefs about 
what is true is correlated with individual preferences. To explain these observations we need to 
turn to the theory of cognitive biases in psychology which goes beyond the view of rational 
beliefs.  
In this study we use one of the most influential hypotheses in environmental economics, 
namely the Porter hypothesis, to test the existence of a preference-expectation relationship in the 
formation of belief of scientific hypothesis. The Porter hypothesis suggests that environmental 
regulations, such as restricting firms to reduce pollution, stimulates innovations and create a win-
win situation for the environment and for firms. Our results show that individuals’ who care 
more about the environment are more likely to believe in the Porter hypothesis.  
  After having found a preference-expectation bias among students we raise the question if 
certain groups of individuals, such as scientists, would be an exemption to such observed 
behavior. Basically there are two possibilities of why scientist might be immune to preference-
expectation bias. They could either have a personal trait that makes them immune to distorted 
judgments (which seems rather unlikely) or it could be something in the scientific methodology 
that offers control against the preference-expectations bias. According to Blaug (2002)  this 
“something” is empirical predictions which serve as the ultimate test of the truth in economic 
theories and could ideally distinguish truth from wishes and intellectual preferences. 
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In a critical review of the environmental economic literature  Folmer and Johansson-
Stenman (2011) observe the tendency for theory and empirics to live rather separate lives in 
environmental economics. We illustrate why the current practice is problematic by showing the 
preference-expectation relationship in the beliefs of the Porter hypothesis and by discussing the 
interplay between beliefs and knowledge.  
Bonilla (2002) discusses that economists assume science progresses like a “free market” 
in which competition causes bad theories to be replaced with good theories, resembling the 
“invisible hand” metaphor. An obstacle to such development is that scientists derive utility from 
having their theories accepted, which could be partly in conflict with the utility derived from 
producing knowledge (Bonilla, 2002). Young et al. (2008) discuss that the incentive structures in 
science favor the publication of dramatic results, which may turn out to be incorrect and create 
publishing bias. Using a student sample, this study has aimed to isolate and test the preference-
expectation link free from biases caused by the pressure to publish. Our result suggests that it is 
not necessary incentives that create the problem of accepting wrong policies and theories but that 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Psychometric measures and Item 
Psychometric Measures  Items 
Ecocentric   One of the worst things about overpopulation is that many natural   
   areas are getting destroyed for development   
Ecocentric   I can enjoy spending time in natural settings just for the sake of   
   being out in nature   
Apathy   Environmental threats such as deforestation and ozone depletion   
   have been exaggerated   
Anthropocentric   The worst thing about the loss of the rain forest is that it will   
   restrict the development of new medicines   
Ecocentric   Sometimes it makes me sad to see forests cleared for agriculture   
Apathy   It seems to me that most conservationists are pessimistic and   
   somewhat paranoid   
Ecocentric   I prefer wildlife reserves to zoos   
Apathy   I do not think the problem of depletion of natural resources is   
   as bad as many people make it out to be   
Apathy   I find it hard to get too concerned about environmental issues   
Anthropocentric   It bothers me that humans are running out of their supply of oil   
Ecocentric   I need time in nature to be happy   
Anthropocentric   The thing that concerns me most about deforestation is that there   
   will not be enough lumber for future generations   
Apathy   I do not feel that humans are dependent on nature to survive   
Ecocentric   Sometimes when I am unhappy I find comfort in nature   
Apathy   Most environmental problems will solve themselves given enough time   
Apathy   I don't care about environmental problems   
Apathy   I'm opposed to programs to preserve wilderness, reduce pollution,   
   and conserve resources   
Ecocentric   It makes me sad to see natural environments destroyed   
Anthropocentric   The most important reason for conservation is human survival   
Anthropocentric   One of the best things about recycling is that it saves money   
Anthropocentric   Nature is important because of what it can contribute to the   
   pleasure and welfare of humans   
Apathy   Too much emphasis has been placed on conservation   
Ecocentric   Nature is valuable for its own sake   
Anthropocentric   We need to preserve resources to maintain a high quality of life   
Ecocentric   Being out in nature is a great stress reducer for me   
Anthropocentric   One of the most important reasons to conserve is to ensure a   
   continued high standard of living   
Ecocentric   One of the most important reasons to conserve is to preserve wild areas   
Anthropocentric   Continued land development is a good idea as long as a high   
   quality of life can be preserved   
Ecocentric   Sometimes animals seem almost human to me   
Ecocentric   Humans are as much a part of the ecosystem as other animals   
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